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                  Abstract 
      
Given that, in equilibrium, all agents freely opt for strictly positive own coverage, 
competitive models of asymmetric information predict a positive relationship between 
coverage and ex post risk (accident probability). On the other hand, some recent 
empirical studies find either negative or no correlation. This paper, by introducing                        
heterogeneity in risk perceptions into an asymmetric information competitive model, 
provides an explanation to this puzzle. The more optimistic agents underestimate their 
accident probability relative to less optimistic and so purchase less insurance. They 
also tend to be less willing to take precautions. This gives rise to separating equilibria 
exhibiting negative or no correlation between coverage and ex post risk that 
potentially explain the puzzling empirical findings. Moreover, the no-correlation 
equilibrium involves some agents being quantity-constrained due to adverse selection. 
Thus, although the no-correlation empirical findings indicate that there may not be 
risk-related adverse selection, they do not imply the absence of other forms of adverse 
selection that have significant effects on the resulting equilibrium.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Most recent empirical studies of insurance markets have focused on the relationship 
between the coverage of the contract and the (average) ex post risk (accident rate) of 
its buyers. The results are mixed. De Meza and Webb (2001) provide casual evidence 
for a negative relationship in the credit card insurance market.1 Cawley and Philipson 
(1999) study of life insurance contracts also shows a negative relationship which, 
however, is not statistically significant. A similar result is obtained by Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000)2 and Dionne, Gourieroux and Vanasse (2001) for the automobile 
insurance market.3 On the other hand, Brugiavini (1993) and Finkelstein and Poterba 
(2000) find a strong positive relationship in the annuities market.  
     Starting with the seminal Rothschild-Stiglitz paper (1976), most theoretical models 
of competitive insurance markets under asymmetric information predict a positive 
relationship between coverage and the (average) ex post risk of the buyer of the 
contract. This prediction is shared by models of pure adverse selection (e.g. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)), pure moral hazard (e.g. Arnott and Stiglitz (1988)) as 
well as models of adverse selection plus moral hazard (e.g. Chassagnon and Chiappori 
(1997) and Chiappori et.al. (2001)). In fact, Chiappori et.al. (2001) argue that the 
positive correlation property is extremely general. However, in a recent paper, de 
Meza and Webb (2001) provide a model where agents are heterogeneous with respect 
to their risk aversion and face a moral hazard problem. Also, insurance companies pay 
a strictly positive fixed administrative cost per claim. In this model, there exist a 
separating and a partial pooling equilibrium predicting a negative relationship but due 
to the fixed cost the less risk-averse agents go uninsured.  
      This paper first shows that these (seemingly) contradictory theoretical results can 
be reconciled. Given that fixed administrative costs are strictly positive, it is shown 
that the Chiappori et.al. argument holds necessarily true only if, in equilibrium, all 
agents choose contracts offering strictly positive own coverage. If, in equilibrium, 
some agents choose zero own coverage, then their assertion is not necessarily true. In 
this case, there exist separating equilibria that exhibit negative (de Meza and Webb 
(2001)) or no correlation (Koufopoulos (2001a)) between coverage and ex post risk. It 
should be stressed that the choice of zero own coverage and these fixed administrative 
costs are not independent. It is precisely the presence of these costs that results in 
some agents (the risk tolerant) choosing not to insure and hence in the breaking of the 
positive relationship.  
     Therefore, competitive models of insurance markets under asymmetric information 
can explain the observed negative or no-correlation between coverage and ex post risk 
in cases where some agents choose zero own insurance and/or purchase only the legal 
minimum of third-party coverage. For example, the Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and 
the de Meza and Webb (2001) empirical findings are perfectly consistent with the 
predictions of these models. However, their prediction is not consistent with negative 
or no-correlation in insurance markets where all agents freely opt for strictly positive 
own coverage. For example, the fact that per unit insurance premiums fall with 
quantity and the negative (point estimate) or no correlation between coverage and the 
accident rate reported by Cawley and Philipson (1999) remain a puzzle.  
                                                 
1 4.8% of U.K. credit cards are reported lost or stolen each year. The corresponding figure for insured 
cards is 2.7%.   
2 In the Chiappori and Salanie (2000) study those opting for less coverage just purchase the legal 
minimum of third-party coverage which can be interpreted as zero own coverage.  
3 All three studies control for observable characteristics known to insurers.  
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     Some answers have been provided in the context of the principal-agent framework 
(monopoly). For example, Jullien, Salanie and Salanie (2000), in a moral hazard 
model, obtain a negative relationship between coverage and ex post risk. In a similar 
framework, Villeneuve (2000) reverses the information structure, he assumes that 
insurers know better the insuree’s accident probability than the insuree himself, and 
finds that a negative relationship is possible. However, insurance markets seem to be 
fairly competitive and so monopoly is not a good approximation. A question then 
arises: How can we go about explaining the negative or no correlation empirical 
findings in a competitive framework under asymmetric information?  
     This paper does so by introducing heterogeneity in risk perceptions in an otherwise 
standard competitive model of asymmetric information. Several psychological studies 
indicate that the majority of human beings are unrealistically optimistic, in the sense 
that they underestimate their accident probability.4 5 On the other hand, Viscusi 
(1990) finds that more individuals overestimate the risk of lung-cancer associated 
with smoking than underestimate it and, on average, they greatly overestimate it. 
Also, those who perceive a higher risk are less likely to smoke. As these studies 
indicate, regardless of the direction of the bias, people hold different beliefs about the 
same or similar risks.6 In general, the more optimistic (henceforth Os) agents 
underestimate their accident probability relative to less optimistic (henceforth Rs) and 
so purchase less insurance. They also tend to be less willing to take precautions. This 
gives rise to separating equilibria exhibiting negative or no correlation between 
coverage and ex post risk that potentially explain the puzzling empirical findings.                                       
     Two examples of separating equilibria are presented where both the Os and the Rs 
choose strictly positive own coverage. The first equilibrium exhibits a negative 
relationship between coverage and ex post risk. The Rs purchase more coverage and 
take precautions whereas the Os, although buy less insurance, do not take precautions. 
In the second one, there is no correlation between coverage and accident probability. 
Both types take precautions but the Rs choose more coverage than the Os.  
Furthermore, the first equilibrium exists even if there is full information about types. 
That is, asymmetric information about types does not affect the nature of this 
equilibrium. However, adverse selection does affect the characteristics of the second 
equilibrium. One type (the Rs) is quantity-constrained. Under full information about 
types, the Rs would have purchased more insurance.  
     Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Dionne et.al. 
(2001) argue that the no-correlation empirical findings imply that there is no (risk-
related) adverse selection. The result in the latter equilibrium suggests that their 
conclusion cannot be generalised. Other forms of adverse selection (e.g. asymmetric 
information about risk perceptions) may be present and give rise to equilibria 
involving some agents being quantity-constrained even if the data show no correlation 
between coverage and the accident rate.  
     The next section briefly describes the Chiappori et.al. framework and shows that if 
some agents choose zero own coverage, then both negative and no correlation 
between coverage and ex post risk are possible. In Section 3, I present a model where 
the agents differ with respect to their risk perceptions and face a moral hazard 
                                                 
4 For a survey see Weinstein and Klein (1996). 
5 For applications of optimism to Economics see de Meza and Southey  (1996) and Manove and Padilla 
(1999).  
6 Given that agents have different information sets, heterogeneity in risk perceptions is not necessarily 
inconsistent with rationality (or even rational expectations).  
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problem. Section 4 provides a diagrammatical proof for the existence of the two 
separating equilibria described above. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Chiappori et.al. Framework 
 
There are two states of nature: good and bad. In the good state the agent incurs no loss 
whereas in the bad state he incurs a loss of θD . The parameter θ   represents all the 
characteristics of the agent (potential insuree) that are his private information (risk, 
risk aversion, loss, etc). An agent of type θ  may privately choose his loss probability 
p−1  in some subset of [0,1]. In pure adverse selection models this subset is a 
singleton whereas in moral hazard models where agents choose their preventive effort 
level, this subset may include two or more points. A contract consists of coverage and 
premium: ),( yyC λ= , 1>λ . The ex post risk of an insuree is a function of the 
contract he chooses. The average ex post risk of insurees choosing contract C  is 
)(1 Cp− . Also, the following assumptions are made: 
 
Assumption 1: For all contracts offered and all agent types overinsurance is ruled out 
by assuming θλ Dy ≤ .  
Assumption 2: Agents are risk averse (in the sense that they are averse to mean-
preserving spreads on wealth).  
Assumption 3: Insurance companies are risk neutral, and incur a cost per contract 
0≥c  and a cost per claim 0≥′c . So, the expected profit of an insurance company 
offering contract ),( yyC λ=  to an agent with ex post risk p−1  is  
 
                                                ccypy −′+−−= ))(1( λπ  
 
Profit Monotonicity (PM) Assumption: If two contracts 1C  and 2C  are chosen in 
equilibrium and 2211 yy λλ < , then )()( 21 CC ππ ≥ . 
 
We can now state and prove the main result of this section. 
 
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1 to 3 and PM if two contracts 1C  and 2C  are 
chosen in equilibrium and 2211 yy λλ < , then )(1)(1 21 CpCp −<−  is necessarily true 
if 22110 yy λλ <<  and  0, ≥′cc . If 011 =yλ  and 0>c  or 0>′c  or 0, >′cc , then 
)(1)(1 21 CpCp −<−  is not necessarily true. Both )(1)(1 21 CpCp −=−  and 
)(1)(1 21 CpCp −>−  are possible.  
 
Proof: The proof is done through two lemmas. 
 
Lemma 1: Suppose an agent θ  chooses the contract )0,0(),( 1111 == yyC λ  over the 
contract ),( 2222 yyC λ=  where 022 >yλ . Then it must be true that 
 
                                                  
22
2
2
1
1)(1
y
yCp
λλ
=<−  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 5 
Intuitively, given risk aversion, if the per unit premium under 2C , 21 λ , were less 
than the ex post risk (accident probability) under 1C  the agent would be strictly better 
off taking contract 2C , rather than going uninsured, while keeping  )(1 1Cp− . 
 
Lemma 2: Suppose )0,0(),( 1111 == yyC λ  and ),( 2222 yyC λ=  are chosen in 
equilibrium. If  0>c  or 0>′c  or 0, >′cc , then it may be true that  
)(1)(1 21 CpCp −≥− . If 01122 >> yy λλ , then )(1)(1 21 CpCp −<−  is always true. 
 
Proof: By Lemma 1 we have  
 
                     
22
2
1 )(1 y
yCp
λ
<−      ⇒       0))(1( 2212 >−− yCpy λ                          (1) 
 
In this case, )( 1Cπ  is (identically) equal to zero. Therefore, 
                       
                                    22121 ))(1(0)( yCpyC λπ −−<=                                          (2) 
 
The expected profit for an insurance company offering contract 2C  is 
         
                       ccyCpyC −′+−−= )))((1()( 22222 λπ                                     (3) 
 
Given (PM), 0)( 1 =Cπ , and the fact that in equilibrium profits cannot be negative, it 
follows that 0)()( 21 == CC ππ . Then, using (2) and (3) we obtain: 
 
                   ]))(1[()))]((1()(1[ 12212 ccCpcyCpCp +′−−>′+−−− λ                     (4) 
 
Given 022 >yλ  and 0>c  or 0>′c  or 0, >′cc , it is clear from (4) that it may well 
be true that )(1)(1 21 CpCp −≥− .  
 
If  01122 >> yy λλ ,  using similar arguments we have: 
 
       
1122
12
1 )(1 yy
yyCp
λλ −
−
<−   ⇒    0)))((1()( 1122112 >−−−− yyCpyy λλ           (5) 
          
Using the expected profit functions )( iCπ , 2,1=i , and (5) we obtain: 
 
               ( ) ( )[ ] )()(1)(1)()( 221221 cyCpCpCC ′+−−−<− λππ                            (6) 
 
Given (PM), (6) implies )(1)(1 21 CpCp −<− . Q.E.D. 
 
In the de Meza and Webb (2001) framework (a special case of the above general 
framework) there exist separating (and partial pooling) equilibria where the risk 
tolerant agents (or some of them) choose zero own coverage ( 011 =yλ ). Therefore, 
both )(1)(1 21 CpCp −>−  (de Meza and Webb (2001)) and )(1)(1 21 CpCp −=−  
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(Koufopoulos (2001a)) are perfectly possible and consistent with the predictions of 
Chiappori et.al. general framework. It should be emphasised that the choice of zero 
own coverage by the less risk-averse agents and the fixed administrative costs are not 
independent. It is precisely the presence of these costs that leads those agents to go 
uninsured and breaks the positive relationship between coverage and (average) ex 
post risk.  
     In summary, if some agents choose zero own coverage, then both negative and no 
correlation between coverage and (average) ex post risk can arise. However, if, in 
equilibrium, all agents choose contracts offering strictly positive own coverage, then 
asymmetric information plus competition among insurance companies imply a strictly 
positive relationship. Therefore, competitive models of insurance markets under 
asymmetric information can explain the observed negative or no-correlation between 
coverage and ex post risk in cases where some agents choose zero own insurance 
and/or purchase only the legal minimum of third-party coverage. For example, the 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and the de Meza and Webb (2001) empirical findings 
are perfectly consistent with the predictions of these models. However, their 
prediction is not consistent with negative or no-correlation in insurance markets 
where all agents freely opt for strictly positive own coverage. For example, the fact 
that the per unit insurance premiums fall with quantity and the negative correlation 
between coverage and the accident rate reported by Cawley and Philipson (1999) 
remain a puzzle. 
     Given that insurance markets are fairly competitive, explanations provided by 
models cast in the principal-agent framework (monopoly) are not satisfactory. This 
paper provides an explanation to this puzzle by introducing heterogeneity in risk 
perceptions. Most standard asymmetric information models of insurance markets 
(including the Chiappori et.al. (2001) model) implicitly assume that all insurees have 
an accurate estimate of their accident probability (given the precautionary effort 
level).7 However, several empirical studies both by psychologists and economists 
indicate that people tend to either underestimate (e.g. Weinstein and Klein (1996)) or 
overestimate (e.g. Viscusi (1990)) their accident probability. The model presented 
below retains the assumption of perfect competition among insurance companies but 
allows agents (insurees) to have different perceptions of the same risk.  
      
3. The Model 
 
There are two states of nature: good and bad. In the good state there is no loss 
whereas in the bad state the individual (insuree) suffers a gross loss of D. Before the 
realisation of the state of nature all individuals have the same wealth level, W.  Also, 
all individuals are risk averse and have the same utility function but differ with 
respect to their perception of the probability of suffering the loss. There are two types 
of individuals, the Rs and the Os. The Rs have an accurate estimate of their true 
probability of avoiding the loss, p, whereas the Os overestimate it.8                                      
     Furthermore, all agents can affect the true probability of avoiding the loss by 
involving in preventive activities. Given the level of precautionary effort, the true 
probability of suffering the loss is the same for both types. I examine the case where 
agents either take precautions or not (two effort levels). If an individual takes 
                                                 
7 Villeneuve (2000) is an exception.  
8 For expositional simplicity, I assume that the more optimistic are optimists whereas the less 
optimistic are realists. However, all the results go through if two types are respectively optimists and 
pessimists or both are optimists with different degrees of optimism.  
 7 
precautions ( FFi = ), he incurs a utility cost of F  and his true probability of 
avoiding the loss )( iFp  is Fp . If he takes no precautions ( 0=iF ), his utility cost is 0 
but his true probability of avoiding the loss )( iFp  is 0p , where 0ppF > . 
     Now, let ),( ii
i KFpp =  be the (perceived) probability function. Where iK  is the 
degree of “optimism” and takes two values: 1 for the Rs  )1( =RK , and 1>K  for the 
Os )1( >= KKO . This probability function is assumed to be strictly increasing in iK . 
As a result, the following relationships are true: 
 
 jiiRi
R
j pFpFpKFpp ==== )()1,(),( ,               ROi ,= ,       0,Fj =                (7) 
 
jiiOi
O
j pFpKFpKFpp =>== )(),(),( ,              ROi ,= ,        0,Fj =               (8) 
 
where jp  is the true probability of avoiding the loss.  
     In this environment, the (perceived) expected utility of an insured agent i is given 
by: 
 
i
i
j
i
jiiiii FyDWUpyWUpWyKFEU −−+−−+−= ))1(()1()(),,,,( λλ ,                                                     
                                                                                               0,Fj =    ROi ,=       (9)                
where      W: insuree’s initial wealth 
                D: gross loss 
                y: insurance premium    
    y)1( −λ : net payout in the event of loss,           1>λ         
            yλ : coverage (gross payout in the event of loss)   
           
Hence, the increase in (perceived) expected utility from taking precautions is: 
 
          ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] FyDWUyWUpp iiFi −−+−−−−=∆ )1(0 λ ,           ROi ,=         (10) 
 
where U  is strictly concave and yDWyW )1( −+−≥− λ  are the wealth levels in the 
good and the bad state respectively.  
     There are two risk neutral insurance companies involved in Bertrand competition. 
Perceived probabilities and actions are private information of each insuree. However, 
insurance companies know the true probability of suffering a loss, the cost for the 
insuree corresponding to each precautionary effort level, the utility function of the 
insurees and the proportion of the Os and Rs in the population. In order to make the 
distinction between the results under different risk perceptions and those of the 
standard competitive models of asymmetric information clearer, I assume that the 
costs of processing claims (or underwriting costs) are zero.9  
     The insurance contract ( )yy λ,  specifies the premium y  and the coverage yλ . As a 
result, since insurance companies know the true accident probability, the expected 
profit of an insurer offering such a contract is: 
 
                                       ( ) yFpyFp ii )1()(1)( −−−= λπ                                       (11) 
                                                 
9 All results go through if fixed administrative costs are strictly positive but not very large.  
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Equilibrium 
 
Insurance companies and insurees play the following two-stage screening game:  
 
Stage 1:  The two insurance companies simultaneously make offers of sets of 
contracts ( )yy λ, . Each insurance company may offer any finite number of contracts.  
Stage 2: Given the offers made by the insurers, insurees apply for at most one contract 
from one insurance company. If an insuree’s most preferred contract is offered by 
both insurance companies, he takes each insurer’s contract with probability ½. The 
terms of the contract chosen determine whether the insuree will take unobservable 
precautions. 
 
I only consider pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). Depending on 
parameter values, four kinds of equilibria can arise: separating, partial-separating, 
full-pooling and partial-pooling. In this paper, I only present the two most interesting 
separating equilibria.10 
     In a separating equilibrium the Os and Rs choose different consumption 
allocations, Oz  and  Rz  respectively. This equilibrium must satisfy: 
 
i) The revelation constraints 
 
                       )()( ORRR zEUzEU ≥  
                                                                                                                                (12.a) 
)()( ROOO zEUzEU ≥   
 
ii) The effort incentive constraints 
 
                                         F           if  0≥∆ i ,    ROi ,=   
                         =iF                                                                                                (12.b)                            
0 otherwise 
 
                   with i∆  defined in (4). 
 
iii) The participation (or IR) constraints of both types: 
 
)()( 0zEUzEU iii ≥ ,    ROi ,=                                                       (12.c) 
 
where  )0,0(),(0 == yyz λ  
 
iv) Profit maximisation for insurance companies: 
 
! No contract in the equilibrium pair ),( RO zz makes negative expected 
profits. 
! No other set of contracts introduced alongside those already in the 
market would increase an insurer’s expected profits.  
                                                 
10 See Koufopoulos (2001b) for an analysis of all different kinds of equilibria.  
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4. Diagrammatic Analysis 
 
Let  yWH −=  and yDWL )1( −+−= λ denote the income of an insuree who has 
chosen the contract ),( yy λ  in the good and bad state respectively. Let also WH =  
and DWL −=  denote the endowment of an insuree after the realisation of the state 
of nature.  
 
4.1. Effort Incentive Constraints 
 
The contract is effort incentive compatible if  
 
[ ] FLUHUpp iiF ≥−− )()()( 0     ⇔      0≥∆ i ,     ROi ,=                               (13) 
 
Let ii PP ′  be the locus of combinations (H, L) such that 0=∆ i . Since F , 0>′U , 
the ii PP ′  locus lies entirely below the 
045  line in the (L, H) space. This locus divides 
the (L, H) space into two regions: On and below the ii PP ′  locus the insurees take 
precautions (this is the set of effort incentive compatible contracts) and above it they 
do not. The slope and the curvature of ii PP ′  in the (L, H) space are given respectively 
by: 
 
0
)(
)(
>
′
′
=
′
LU
HU
dH
dL
iiPP
             since  0>′U                                                (14) 
 
            


−
′
′
′
′
=
′
)(
)(
)()(
)(
)(
2
2
HA
LU
HULA
LU
HU
dH
Ld
iiPP
                                                   (15) 
 
where     
)(
)()(
LU
LULA
′
′′
−=  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
 
Since both types have the same utility function, it is clear from the above formulas 
that the shape of ii PP ′  is independent of the type of the insuree. In addition, ii PP ′  is 
upward sloping. Also if )(⋅U  exhibits either increasing or constant absolute risk 
aversion ii PP ′  is strictly concave. If )(⋅U  exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, it 
can be either concave or convex. (See the Appendix for a necessary and sufficient 
condition in order for ii PP ′  to be strictly convex).  
     However, the position of ii PP ′  does depend upon the insuree’s type. Although the 
Os overestimate their probability of avoiding the loss at any given precautionary 
effort level, they may either overestimate or underestimate the increase in that 
probability from choosing a higher preventive effort level. Though both cases are 
possible, the latter seems to be more reasonable especially if, given that no 
precautions are taken, the perceived probability of avoiding the accident is high.11 In 
                                                 
11 This assumption is also consistent with Viscusi’s (1990) finding that those who perceive a higher 
risk are less likely to smoke. The more pessimistic agents take more precautions.  
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this paper the analysis is conducted under the assumption that the latter case is 
relevant.12  In particular, the following assumption is made: 
 
Assumption 1:    OOF
RR
F pppp 00 −>−  
 
That is, the Rs’ set of effort incentive compatible contracts is strictly greater than that 
of the Os. It is also assumed that 
 
Assumption 2:   [ ] FLUHUpp iiF >−− )()()( 0 ,      ROi ,=  
 
Assumption 2 implies that both RRPP ′  and OOPP ′  pass above the endowment point, and 
so the effective set of effort incentive compatible contracts is not empty for either 
type.  
     Two points must be stressed here. First, Assumption 1 is required for but does not 
necessarily imply a negative relationship between coverage and ex post risk. It may 
well be the case that Assumption 1 holds and a separating or a partial pooling 
equilibrium arises exhibiting a positive relationship.13 Second, although, Assumption 
1 is necessary for the negative correlation prediction, Assumption 2 does not need to 
hold for the Os. In fact, this result obtains more easily if the direction of inequality in 
Assumption 2 is reversed for the Os. That is, if the Os never take precautions. On the 
contrary, the no-correlation result requires Assumption 2 but not Assumption 1.14 It 
obtains even if the Os overestimate not only their probability of avoiding the accident 
but also the increase in that probability from taking precautions.   
 
4.2. Indifference Curves 
 
The indifference curves, labelled iI , are kinked where they cross the corresponding 
ii PP ′  locus. Above ii PP ′ , insurees of the the i-type do not take precautions, their 
perceived probability of avoiding the loss is ip0 , and so the slope of iI  is:  
 
)(
)(
1 0
0
, 0
LU
HU
p
p
dH
dL
i
i
ppIi
′
′
−
−=
=
             ROi ,=                                           (16) 
 
On and below ii PP ′  insurees of the i-type do take precautions, their perceived 
probability of avoiding the loss rises to iFp  and so the slope of iI  becomes: 
 
)(
)(
1, LU
HU
p
p
dH
dL
i
F
i
F
ppI Fi
′
′
−
−=
=
               ROi ,=                                        (17) 
 
Hence, just above ii PP ′  the i-type indifference curves become flatter.  
                                                 
12 See Koufopoulos (2001b) for a comprehensive analysis of both cases.  
13 See Koufopoulos (2001b) for some examples.  
14 The no-correlation result obtains even if the direction of the inequality in Assumption 2 is reversed. 
However, this assumption would imply that both types never take precautions and so this case is not 
very interesting.  
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4.3. Insurers’ Zero-profit Lines (Offer Curves) 
 
Using the definitions yWH −=  and yDWL )1( −+−= λ , and the fact that 
insurance companies know the true accident probabilities, the insurers’ expected 
profit function becomes:      
   
                 ( )( )DWLFpHWFp ii +−−−−= )(1))((π                                            (18) 
 
The zero-profit lines are given by: 
 
          DH
Fp
FpW
Fp
L
i
i
i
−
−
−
−
=
)(1
)(
)(1
1                                                   (19) 
 
Conditional on the preventive effort level chosen by the two types of insurees, there 
are three zero-profit lines with slopes: 
 
0
0
0 1 p
p
dH
dL
−
−=
=π
                   (EN’ line)                                                  (20) 
 
 
F
F
p
p
dH
dL
−
−=
=
10π
                  (EJ’ line)                                                    (21) 
 
 
q
q
dH
dL
−
−=
=
10π
                    (EM’ line (pooled –line))                           (22)       
 
01( ppF µµ −+=  and µ
 is the proportion of the Rs in the population of 
insurees. 
     Also, at 
WHH ==
, Eq.(19) becomes:         DWL −=                                  (23) 
 
Eq. (23) is independent of the value of )(iFp . This implies that all three zero-profit 
lines have the same starting point (the endowment point, E).  
     We can now state and prove the two main results. The negative correlation result is 
shown in Proposition 2 whereas Proposition 3 provides an example that shows the 
theoretical possibility of no-correlation between coverage and ex post risk.        
 
Proposition 2: If the Os’ indifference curve tangent to NE ′,  ∗
O
I , passes above the 
intersection of JE ′  and RRP ′  and meets OOPP ′  above JE ′ , then there exists a unique 
separating equilibrium ),(OR zz  where the Rs take precautions whereas the Os do not. 
Both types choose strictly positive own coverage but the Rs buy more than the Os 
(see Figure 1).15  
 
                                                 15 T his is true if 
)(0ppF − is sufficiently small and the degrees of optimism and risk aversion are 
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Proof:  We test whether ),( OR zz  is an equilibrium by con
Clearly, the Os strictly prefer Oz  to Rz . Offers above JE ′  are 
Similarly, offers above RRPP ′  either do not attract any type 
unprofitable. Below JE ′  and below RRPP ′  there is no offer that
there are some offers that attract the Os and so are unprofitable (g
contract Rz , the Rs are attracted only by contracts that lie above
course, loss-making). So, there is no profitable deviation and the
unique separating equilibrium. The fact that ∗OI  passes above
pooling equilibrium. Therefore, ),( OR zz  is the unique equilibrium
 
     The result in Proposition 2 is consistent with both the negative
coverage and ex post risk (point estimate) and the fact that per uni
the quantity of insurance purchased as reported by Cawley and Ph
Rs not only purchase more coverage but also take more preca
accident probability is lower than that of the Os. Competitio
companies then implies that they will also pay a lower per unit p
this separating equilibrium exists even if there is full informatio
types choose the contract they would have chosen if their 
observable but they faced the moral hazard problem. That is, adve
effect on the nature of this equilibrium (neither revelation cons
equilibrium).  
 
Proposition 3: Suppose ME ′  does not cut RI  through the inters
and ∗OI  (the Os’ indifference curve tangent to JE ′  below OOPP ′  a
Then there exists a unique separating equilibrium where both typ
positive coverage and take precautions but the Rs buy more ins
That is, this equilibrium exhibits no correlation between covera
probability (see Figure 2).  
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Proof: Consider the following deviations. Clearl
The same is true for offers above RRPP ′ . Betwe
there is no offer that attracts Rs and does not att
offers that attract only the Bs. Thus, any offer in 
equilibrium contracts, below JE ′  and below OP
to either type. Hence, the pair ),( OR zz  is 
Furthermore, the fact that ME ′  does not cut be
any pooling equilibrium. Therefore, the pair 
Q.E.D.  
 
     Strictly speaking, the no-correlation prediction
practice. However, if one interprets it as a failure
it is consistent with the findings of Cawley and
(2001) about the relationship between cover
Furthermore, if we allow for strictly positive adm
the model also explains the negative relations
premiums. Since both types take precautions the
and so are charged the same constant marginal p
that the Os purchase less coverage implies that t
In fact, Cawley and Philipson find that a fixed p
constant marginal cost explain almost all risk-adj
     Also, a slight modification of the model gi
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underwriting costs, the resulting equilibrium inv
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constraint is binding in equilibrium). Under fu
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     It is also shown that no correlation between coverage and the accident rate does 
not necessarily imply that adverse selection is absent or has no significant effects on 
the resulting equilibrium. In fact, there exist equilibria exhibiting no correlation 
between coverage and ex post risk that involve some agents (insurees) being quantity-
constrained due to adverse selection.  
 
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1 
 
Consider a contract ),( 22 yyC ′=′ λ with premium:  22)1( ypy λ−=′  
We will show that the agent prefers C ′  to 1C . Notice that if the agent still has ex post 
risk p−1  under C ′  ( )(1)(1 1 CpCp ′−=− ), then he faces the following lottery: 
 
                                       ),;1,( 22 pypyyDL ′−−′−+−=′ λθ  
 
The expectation of this lottery is: 
 
                θθθ λλ DpyyDpypyyDp )1())(1())(1( 2222 −−=′−+−−=′−′−+−−  
 
Clearly, it is equal to the expectation of the lottery 
    
                                                    ),0;1,(1 ppDL −−= θ  
 
which the agent faces under 1C . Since 22110 yy λλ <=  and contracts do not 
overinsure, lottery 1L  is a mean-preserving spread of L′ . Thus, given risk aversion, 
the agent strictly prefers L′  to 1L . Furthermore, since under C ′  he may choose 
another pp −≠′− 11  that costs him less than p−1 , he strictly prefers C ′  to 1C  and 
hence to 2C  (by assumption, 1C  is preferred to 2C ). However, contracts C ′  and 2C  
offer the same coverage. Therefore, since C ′  is strictly preferred to 2C , it must be the 
case that 
 
                     222 )1( ypyy λ−=′>   ⇒     
222
2
1
1)(1
λλ
=<−
y
yCp                     QED.  
 
Appendix B 
 
The equation of the ii PP ′  locus )0( =∆ i is: 
 
         [ ] 0)()()( 0 =−−−=∆ FLUHUpp iiFi                                                         (B.1)              
 
By totally differentiating (B.1) we obtain: 
 
         [ ] 0)()()( 0 =′−′− dLLUdHHUpp iiF    ⇒    0)(
)(
>
′
′
=
′ LU
HU
dH
dL
iiPP
              (B.2) 
 
Also ii PP ′  implicitly defines L as a function of H, that is  
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         )(HgL =                                                                                                       (B.3) 
 
Using (B.2) and taking into account (B.3) we obtain: 
 
[ ] [ ] )(
)(
)(
)()(
)(
)()(
)(
)()(
)(
)(
222
2
LU
HU
LU
LUHU
LU
HU
dH
Hdg
LU
LUHU
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HU
dH
Ld
iiPP
′
′
′
′′′
−
′
′′
=
′
′′′
−
′
′′
=
′
  ⇒  
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′
′
′
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
′
′
′
′′
−
′
′′
′
′
=
′
)(
)(
)()(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
2
2
HA
LU
HULA
LU
HU
LU
HU
LU
LU
HU
HU
LU
HU
dH
Ld
iiPP
     (B.4) 
 
where  
)(
)()(
⋅′
⋅′′
−=⋅
U
UA   is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  
 
ii PP ′  is concave in the (L,H) space iff  02
2
≤
′iiPP
dH
Ld , and using (B.4) we have: 
 
                                                       
)(
)(
)(
)(
HU
HA
LU
LA
′
≤
′
                                             (B.5) 
 
Since H>L, increasing or constant absolute risk aversion implies that ii PP ′  is concave 
in the (L,H) space. 
 
ii PP ′  is strictly convex in the (L,H) space iff  02
2
>
′iiPP
dH
Ld  and using (B.4) we have:  
 
                                                       
)(
)(
)(
)(
HU
HA
LU
LA
′
>
′
                                             (B.6)  
 
Notice that UA ′  is the derivative of the inverse of the marginal utility ( U ′1 ). This 
implies that the condition (B.6) is satisfied iff ( U ′1 ) is strictly concave. This 
condition is stronger than decreasing absolute risk aversion. Therefore, decreasing 
absolute risk aversion is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ii PP ′  to be 
strictly convex in the (L,H) space.  
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